Changing Patterns in Fatwas on Women in Post-Revolutionary Iran

 Abstract

From the perspective of Shīʿa jurisprudence, the first encounters of the Iranian society with modernity were a terrain full of new problematics (mustahdithāt) that needed to be controlled and disciplined. Women’s bodies were at the center of the new controversy and different strategies were adopted by the jurists to facilitate and perpetuate the hegemony of fiqh over them. A number of scholars, including Liyakat Takim believe that since the 1979 revolution a new discursive shift toward femininity and its definitions has emerged, and topics such as gender equality, temporary marriage, child custody, the right to divorce, and inheritance, have become central to jurisdictional discussions. Indicative of their observation is the radical change from past rulings, when Shīʿī jurists embraced a more conservative approach to women (Takim 2022). However, the present paper contends that their new approach to the mustahdithāt was in fact shaped by the changes in the status of women that evolved during the era of Muhammad Reza Shah and should be understood in light of the developments in women’s legal and social status during the period 1925-1979. From this perspective, there was more inspiration by, and impact of the predominant secular discourse of the past, than the emergence of a new juridical era in its discontinuity from the past. 

To investigate the authenticity of this ‘new’ juridical episteme, this paper discusses the fatwas of a number of faqīhs, who, by adopting a coordinated approach, rode on the back of socio-political changes and the dominant discourses about women and attempted to influence it. They broke away from the established juridical dialogue on women and came up with a more egalitarian approach to the role of gender in socio-political life. This paper will argue that the new rulings and fatwas are based on a fresh epistemological and ethical basis, which itself is the result of a different methodology adopted by these figures. Their wrestle with the hermeneutics of text in the ever-changing context of a post-revolutionary society, has borne fruit in a new concept of ijtihad. Secondly, as will be observed, this approach to juridical texts, as well as the new conception of ijtihad, is easily adaptable to Twelver Shīʿīsm title ʿAdlīya (lit. of justice, people of justice), and to the purpose of divine law. Lawgiver, according to this perspective, desires ʿadl for people, and the new fiqh would be in line with such an objective. Thirdly, I will delve into the new fatwas following the most recent development in Iran, namely Woman-Life-Freedom, to see how the jurists have understood and discussed it with regard to justice.

  Keywords: fatwas, Shīʿa jurisprudence, ijtihad, justice.

From Revolution to Reform Era

After forty-five years, we are now in a better position to grasp the internal mechanisms behind the interactions of the two layers of ‘text’ and ‘context’, which have marked Iran’s cultural and political landscapes for almost half a century. What scholars, including Takim (2022), Mavani (2020), Kadivar (2015), among others, call the ‘new epistemic change’, was itself a reaction to the developments that had happened earlier in the social and philosophical spheres. Khomeini’s fatwas on women in the post 1979 era were in line with these changes, although wrapped in a religious covering to mobilize them by inciting their revolutionary potential. From this perspective, his antagonistic discourse had been shaped by changes made by the Shah and was a reaction to them at the same time. By otherizing the national and secular political philosophy of the Pahlavis, Khomeini in fact benefitted from them, adding a great dose of revolutionary fervor, and turning the table against the regime. One of the first instances of this was the right of divorce for women, granted to them by Khomeini in a fatwa in 1980.

Khomeini was asked to express his legal opinion about women’s right to divorce and whether they could have the same authority as men, he responds that “women enjoy the full authority of divorce and can be their own wakīl in divorcing themselves from their husbands in case of mistreatment or they want to remarry” (Khomeini, 1358 Sh/1980).[1] This fatwa was incorporated into “sharṭ-i ḍimn ʿaqd”, itself part of the requirements for marriage (ʿaqd) and later integrated into the marriage certificate in Iran. However, the author believes that this fatwa has less to do with women and their dignity (in the way Khomeini and his followers asked us to believe), and more to do with the mechanisms of power in the post-revolutionary Iran. The fact that Khomeini was the only jurist with such an opinion is a proof to our analysis.

The first years of the establishment of the new regime, followed by the post Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) era until the presidency of Muhammad Khatami in 1998, were witness to radical changes in the lives of women, as they took on more public roles from their participation in the war to their involvement in a vast array of diverse occupations and responsibilities behind the scenes. Regarding this, the first two decades of the full Islamization moved in an opposite, yet unexpected direction, as the whole era can be characterized by notions such as “self”, “mobility”, “activity” and “equality”. However, despite their bold participation in the war in one way or another, the war literature provides us with a distorted and ideological image of women, and in no way reflects the reality of their challenging roles as mother, wife, sister, and daughter.

Reform Era

Owing to the second wave followed by the presidency of Khatami from 1998 to 2006, several reformist figures became the voices of change, and areas such as human rights, rights of political prisoners, and the rights of unrecognized religious minorities, including Bahāʾīs, became important. Jurists such as the late Ayatollah Yūsuf Ṣāniʿī (d. 2020), who was one of Khomeini’s favorite students, became forerunners of the new juridical rulings on women. Ṣāniʿī was a reformist in uṣūl al-fiqh and in fiqh ul-ḥadīth and believed in the principle of ease (lit. qāʿida-yi suhūlat), which originally belonged to Ayatollah Muḥammad Ḥasan Najafī Iṣfahānī (d. 1266 / 1849) and later his prominent student, Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī (d. 1281 / 1864). According to this principle, which was elaborated by Anṣārī, Islam is the sharia of sahla wa samḥa (ease), based on this Qurʾānīc āyah, stating that “God desires ease for you, and He does not desire hardship for you. [It is] so that you may complete the number and magnify God for having guided you, that haply you may give thanks” (2: 185) (Nasr, 2015, p. 81).

Ṣāniʿī believed in dynamic ijtihad and fiqh-i jawāhirī, with a particular emphasis on several issues, chief among them ‘governance in the time of occultation’, ‘the public administration of the jurists’ and ‘the general vicegerency of the just jurist’ (wilāyat al-ʿāmmah), as well as involving custom (ʿurf) in juridical reasoning. Fiqh-i jawāhirī, which was coined by Khomeini, takes its name from the abovementioned Najafī’s magnum opus, Jawāhir ul-kalām fī sharḥi sharāyiʿ ul-islām (the Jewelry of the Words in the Explanation of the Islamic Laws). Najafī later became known as ṣāḥib-i jawāhir. Due to a number of factors, including its comprehensiveness, simple and understandable language, the diversity of resources being used to come to arguments - from historical to juridical, to literary and to ʿilm-i rijāl - and its inclusive methodology in investigating one juridical question (masʾalaya fiqhīya wāḥid) from different perspectives and after consulting multiple opinions, Jawāhir ul-kalām became one of the most important books in the Shīʿa fiqh. It is well-known that studying Jawāhir ul-kalām will make it unnecessary for a jurist to need any other juridical books. In all probability, in addition to its other distinctions including, but not limited to, using custom as one of the sources of reasoning, Khomeini found Fiqh-i jawāhirī attractive and beneficial, because it lays emphasis on the socio-political capacities of jurisprudence. Since its writing, Jawāhir ul-kalām has been a pivotal book at the most advanced level of learning in seminaries, known as baḥth or dars-i khārij (Ṣāniʿī, 1390 Sh, passim).

For Ṣāniʿī, justice – or rather customary justice (and injustice, ʿidālat-i ʿurfī) – is a juridical rule (qāʿadaya fiqhī), and the jurist needs to adjust jurisprudence to the necessities of time and location to come up with just rulings. Shīʿa jurisprudence is characterized and in fact progressed by these differences in legal rulings that originate from justice as a juridical rule, according to which what is Just in the past, might not be Just in the future. In keeping with this viewpoint, the entire Shīʿa jurisprudence is based on different, and at times contradictory fatwas (Qābil, 1390 Sh, p. 57 & pp. 175-265), themselves a clear indication of

“the central role played by human agency and reasoning in the conceptualization and interpretation of laws. The disparate and at times conflicting fatawa issued by prominent jurists also suggest that rather than rethinking and revising Islamic legal theory or suggesting a comprehensive reform program, they merely differ with other jurists on particular points of law. At most, their measures or revisions highlight distinctive interpretations or views” (Takim, 2022, Op. cit., p. 45).

Another student of Khomeini and his onetime heir apparent, Husayn ʿAlī Muntaẓirī (d. 2009) also argues that since sharia is regulated consistent with justice, and ignoring the advantages and disadvantages (maṣāliḥ wa mafāsid) of believers by the Lawgiver is ẓulm, and He does not commit ẓulm, in a similar way, jurisprudence needs to be just in its ruling. Justice in tashriʿ is to assign rights to their owners (Ibid., p. 58).

Ṣāniʿī had a number of innovative fatwas, including but not limited to, the redefinition of the age of puberty for girls from nine to thirteen, which itself resulted in changes in other areas such as rulings in ʿibādāt, marriage, and financial affairs (Ṣāniʿī, 1387). Mihdī Mihrīzī, whose juridical ideas will be discussed in the following, calls Ṣāniʿī “a people-oriented religious reformist with a simple lifestyle”, who “revisits the traditional juridical frameworks and the conventional definition of ijtihad” (Mihrīzī, 1400 Sh). According to Mihrīzī, a ‘religious reformist’ is different from a ‘religious intellectual’ in various ways, including his background in the ḥawza and not university like religious intellectuals, and in his new readings and interpretations (tafsīr) of the sacred sources to access the new findings. Distinguishing between tafsīr and taʾwīl, Mihrīzī maintains that the job of a faqīh of the scale of Ṣāniʿī is to avoid taʾwīl, any replacement of, or change in ḥadīth, or involving extra-juridical sources in the process of iftāʾ, but to dig into the intricacies and particulars of the sources with the help of intellect and through the lens of justice to find new answers for the mustahdithāt.[2]  

Mihrīzī has written extensively on the jurisprudence of women, and his books, Shakhṣīyat wa ḥuqūq zan dar Islam (the Legal Status and the Rights of Women in Islam),[3] Zan dar andīshaya islāmī (Woman in Islamic Thought)[4], and Zan wa Farhang-i Dīnī (Woman and Religious Culture),[5] locate women and their legal status in the context of historical changes and socio-cultural customs of their time. He is particularly interested in investigating the juridical foundations of discrimination against women in Shīʿa jurisprudence, and to this end, he compares the relevant approaches in the three historical phases of the Constitutional Revolution, of 1340 to 1370 Sh, and of 1370 onwards. Mihrīzī concludes that the second and third phases indicate a more progressive juridical outlook, as for thinkers such as Murtaḍā Muṭaharī, ʿAlī Sharīʿtī, Rūḥullāh Khomeini and Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī (known as ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī), there are no serious natural, legal and cognitive differences between women and men, and due to their identical natural dispositions, the differences are explicable in a rational way. On the other hand, the fuqahā of the third phase, including Ṣāniʿī, among others, adopted a divergent approach to the differences between men and women, demanding “a review in ijtihad” (bāznigarī-ya ijtihādī) (Mihrīzī, 1393 Sh). According to Mihrīzī, Ṣāniʿī’s juridical enterprise is shaped around the two elements of ‘the equality of women and men’ and ‘justice in lawgiving or tashrīʿ, which makes him outstanding and innovative in iftāʾ (Mihrīzī, 1400 Sh, Op. cit.).

However, 1998 to 2006 was hardly just about women, although changes in other areas impacted their situation too. Indicative of this analysis is the emphasis on ideas such as the inalienable and natural right of man to have self-control and self-determination, which inevitably clashes with the current political philosophy of the Islamic regime, i.e., wilayāt al-faqīh. Muntaẓirī’s school, emphasizing the discussion of jurisprudence through the lens of human rights, has borne fruit in the emergence of a new generation of religious intellectuals who have stepped beyond the conventional issues such as women and their fiqh. Ibtidhāl-i marjaʿīyat-i Shīʿa (the Banality of the Shīʿa Source of Religious Emulation) of Mohsen Kadivar, a student of Muntaẓirī is a good example in this regard.[6]

The Green Movement and Afterwards

The Green Movement (2009) was on one hand in line with the Iṣlāḥāt (Reform) era, and on the other marked the beginning of the third wave, in which public expectations about women, minorities, people’s rights, and the legitimacy of the regime, became more radical. There were, nevertheless, still women, who were hopeful of finding justice within their faith by adhering to ‘the Islamic feminism’, as a solution to the problematic of Islam and modernism. Ziba Mir-Hosseini locates them in the context of the trilogy of women, modernity and Islam, as well as in their differences with secular feminists, Islamists and religious traditionalists, who either deny the capability of religious authority or the legitimacy of modernity to give them justice. The new fatwas and the religious intellectuals came concomitant with Islamic feminists, who claimed the tradition and placed themselves within it:

“Faced by an apparent choice between the devil of those who want to impose patriarchal interpretations of Islam’s sacred texts, and the deep blue sea of those who pursue a neo-colonialist hegemonic global project in the name of enlightenment and feminism, those of us committed to achieving justice for women and a just world have no other option than to bring Islamic and feminist perspectives together (Mir-Hosseini, 2011, p. 10)”.

The articulation of what the late Ayatollah, Husayn ʿAlī Muntaẓirī (d. 2008) and his students, particularly ʿImād al-Dīn Bāqī call ‘the jurisprudence of human rights’, coincided with the crystallization of ‘Islamic feminism’, as a way out of the binary of ‘Islam’ vs. ‘feminism’, and at the same time an alternative for the traditional Islamic viewpoint on women, the discourse of the Islamists, and the secular feminists. The brand new jurisprudence of Muntaẓirī was characterized by a shift from obligation and duty (taklīf) to right (ḥaqq) and to a right-oriented fiqh.[7] The writings of feminists like Ṣiddīqah Wasmaqī,[8] who also has a traditional Islamic learning background, challenged the orthodox understanding of women. In harmony with her male peers, albeit to a lesser extent, Wasmaqī has become engaged with juridical hermeneutics and textual undertakings, which aids her in coming up with a non-conservative and reformist interpretation of the sacred sources in the light of socio-political developments or context. Furthermore, she put her findings into action by removing her hijab after the Woman-Life-Freedom uprising in September 2022, and calling out Khamenei as the main force responsible for the brutal suppression of people.

Aḥmad Qābil, who had the ijāza (permission) of ijtihad from his master, the late Muntaẓirī, wrote on a wide range of topics, including the relationship between ʿaql wa naql (intellect and non-rational transmitted sources),[9] stoning and its legal credibility in Islam[10], a critique of violent culture,[11] Islam and social security,[12] and several writings on women and their rulings.[13] His findings in Sharīʿat-i ʿaqlānī were based on a new epistemological and ethical grounding, which itself was a result of the different methodology he adopted, and that is why his struggle with the hermeneutics of text in an ever-changing context paid off in a new concept of ijtihad and of divine law (Qābil, 1391 Sh). In terms of his findings on women, including covering, inheritance, the supremacy of men over women, punishment of women in the Qurʾān (4:34), polygamy, temporary marriage, divorce, among others, Qābil stands in line with other reformists, whose juridical enterprise is as much divine as reasonable.  

As an example, he does not believe in the obligatory nature of the hijab for women, and instead adheres to the ‘permissibility’ of the hijab for head and neck, although other parts of body must be covered properly. In other words, the hijab of head and neck is mustaḥab (recommended) and not wājib and it is in the hands of women themselves to decide about it (Qābil, 1392 Sh, p. 56). Or, in āyah thirty-four of sūrat ul-nisāʾ,[14] which is traditionally taken as Qurʾānīc proof for the supremacy (qawwāmīya) of men over women, Qābil adopts an opposite perspective. He maintains that men are in fact obliged to provide their wives with their needs, which guarantee their comfort and well-being. Also qawwāmīya means “but persistent activities that will eventually result in providing women with not just their basic needs, but also their prosperity and comfort” (Ibid., p. 30). It is in light of this verse that the status of men as manager and director should be understood, because if they should put all their efforts into providing their wives with their best, then the household and business management should be handed over to them as well, although this does not produce any right, but a responsibility for men (Ibid., pp. 29-30).

Qābil’s juridical perspective bears similarities with that of Muṣṭafā Muḥaqiq Dāmād, who distinguishes between the Lawgiver’s intentions based on justice, and the legal constraints that jurisprudence places on women. As an example, the condition of maleness (sharṭ-i dhukūrīyat) for qiḍāwat (judgeship), as a result of which women were prohibited from taking this office, was not embedded in jurisprudence until Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (known as Shaykh al-Ṭāʾifah, d. 460/1067) in the 5^th/11^th century. However, Ṭūsī’s ruling was challenged by a number of his peers in the Safavid era, who voted for the right of judgeship for women, as Ṭūsī’s opinion sounded baseless to them. One can mention Muqaddas Ardabīlī (Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ardabīlī, d. 993/1585), Mīrzāya Qumī (Mīrzā Abulqāsim Ibn Muḥammad Ḥasan Shaftī Qumī, d. 1231/1816), and the abovementioned Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī, who did not adhere to such a prohibition either (Muḥaqiq Dāmād, 1388 Sh).

Woman-Life-Freedom rose so fast and furiously, and appeared to be so stubborn and tenacious that it left both the seminarians and reformist scholars dumbfounded. From among the former, Ayatollah Jawādī Ᾱmulī took a phony ‘positive’ stance by saying that “yes, we agree with this slogan [i.e., Woman-Life-Freedom]” (Ᾱmulī, 1401 Sh), however, he made everyone smile (and at the same time disappointed) when he said that “the only thing that settles this sedition (ghāʾila) down, is the thought of death, because the thought of death, which is the outcome of [religious] education, makes us ask the question if we will rot or revitalize” (Ibid.). Which means that since according to Islamic teachings, Man’s life will not come to an end (or ‘rot’ so to speak) by death and continues in the Hereafter, then making oneself busy with this passing and momentary life is not wise. So, ‘life’ (this worldly tangible life, as one of the components of Woman-Life-Freedom) should not be an end, because this temporary life does not matter, and everyone, including women should think about their life in the Hereafter. And how about the other components, i.e., woman and freedom? Ᾱmulī convinces us he will never touch upon them.[15] 

His peer, Ayatollah Nāṣir Makārim Shīrāzī, is even more disappointing. After two years of being silent about the course of events, he finally admits that coercion and force are not a solution to the hijab. However, he encourages the government to ‘solve’ the issue gradually and peacefully by starting with government employees.[16] One should not be fooled by his confession that coercion will no longer work, because he still believes that the hijab is a problem and will be solved through proper official channels. The fact is that this so-called ‘body engineering’ will never leave the jurists alone; only the tools change according to the situation. On the other hand, there was the stance of reformist scholars including Mohsen Kadivar, who advocates the full freedom of people to pursue their lifestyle, as there should not be any compulsion in imposing a certain kind of lifestyle on others (Kadivar, 1401 Sh). Pertinent to this was the open statement of numerous seminarians of Qom, Tehran and Mashhad, who not only supported women’s rights to choose their hijab, but also declared Khamenei’s claim of leadership “null and void”. The statement, which was issued a few days after the death of Mahsa Amini and had a harsh tone, declared that “anyone who was involved in suppressing the protests and/or injuring and killing protesters is sentenced to retribution and blood money according to the sharia of the Prophet Muhammad”.[17]

A few months after Woman-Life-Freedom and in January 2023, Bihnām Qulīpūr conducted a research on the diversity of the fatwas of a number of pro and against compulsory hijab clerics, and the result was interesting. Out of forty-one marjaʿ taqlīd, who were investigated, three of them (7.31 percent) expressed no opinion about the principle of enjoining good and forbidding wrong (amr bi maʿrūf wa nahy az munkar) on implementing hijab in public, and the rest accepted the necessity of using this principle to execute hijab. Furthermore, only four marjaʿ taqlīd did not adhere the compulsory hijab, whereas on the opposite, nineteen of them brought arguments and issued fatwa for the necessity of the implementation of hijab in public space. On the requirements of having wilāyat al-faqīh (or following the Islamic rulings ratified by an Islamic government), five marjaʿ (comprising 12.9 percent), refrained to express their opinion, and five others did not believe in the Islamic government at all.

On the other hand, there are twenty-two marjaʿ, who believed in wilāyat al-faqīh and/or observing the Islamic rulings of the Islamic government, and ten of them issued fatwas in favour of the necessity of having an Islamic government. Relevant to this is their opinions about qāʿadaya ʿumūmīya taʿzīrāt (lit. general rule of punishment),[18] according to which, twenty of them (48.78 percent) did not have any opinion about it, seventeen (41.46) accepted it, and the rest (consisting of three marjaʿ) did not believe in it at all. Regarding hijab, the jurists, whose fatwas were investigated in this research are classified into three groups. First, the adherents of the necessity of executing the principle of enjoining good and forbidding wrong by people arbitrarily and without having the permission of the government in order to impose hijab in public. This group goes so far as to support this law even if it harms people physically. On the other hand, there are clerics who concede with using this principle only after securing the permission of a jurist. According to this group, the death punishment of a sinner (the one who refrains to wear scarf) is only possible by the permission of a jurist. The last group is those who do not support harming or killing people just because they have broken Islamic laws, no matter with or without the permission of a jurist (Bihnām Qulīpūr, 2023).

Conclusion

Women were the first, and at the same time the most steadfast opponents of the Islamic regime, and Khomeini and his disciples knew that, and that’s why they abrogated the Family Protection Law (ratified in 1346 Sh/1968 and modified in 1353 Sh/1975),[19] in one of their first moves. The rest is history; as the quest for change, which touches upon every corner of women’s lives, from marriage, including marriage of Muslim women to non-Muslim men, to egalitarian rulings in divorce, to abortion, to child custody and to women’s political status, has never settled down. However, there still exist sensitive areas such as white marriage, which is going to be more widespread among the youth, as well as same-sex marriage, which have not received adequate attention by the new improvements in jurisprudence.[20] Only the passage of time will prove whether jurisprudence can find solutions to these mustahdithāt, or whether these issues will forever remain outside the realm of jurisprudence.

I prefer to wrap up this short paper with a personal recollection: as soon as Woman-Life-Freedom triggered off two years ago in September 2022, I started looking for any ḥadīth in ḥadīth compilations, or any narrative of the life of the Imams that could possibly support the regime’s claim about the religious basis for the compulsory hijab. To my surprise, I found nothing, nor was there even one historical account reporting the Imams’ words or deeds that could justify such a claim. Sharing my findings with a friend, who was an expert in ḥadīth and jurisprudence, he also confirmed that the forty-five-year policy of compulsory head covering is religiously baseless, and hence it only is traceable to the insatiable desire of a phallic and control freak apparatus for dominance and supremacy.

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Muḥaqiq Dāmād, Muṣṭafā, < https://www.isna.ir/news/8809-08695/%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A2%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%82-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B2 >, 1388 Sh, last accessed 10/28/2024.

Nasr, Seyyed Hossein and Others (eds.), the Study Quran, a New Translation and Commentary, 2015 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers).

Qābil, Hādī (Djāmī), Qāʿadaya ʿadālat wa nafya ẓulm: bi dhamīmaya guftagū bā ḥaḍrat Ayatollah al-ʿuẓmā Ṣāniʿī (the Rule of Justice and the Negation of Injustice: A Conversation with Ayatollah Yūsuf Ṣāniʿī), 1^st edition, 1390 Sh (Qom: Fiqh ul-thaqalayn publication).

Qābil, Aḥmad, Aḥkām-i bānawān dar sharīʿat-i muḥammadī (Women’s Rulings in the Muḥammedan Sharīʿa), 1392 Sh (n. d.).

Qābil, Aḥmad, Sharīʿat-i ʿaqlānī: maqālātī dar nisbat-i ʿaql wa sharʿ (the Rational Sharīʿa: Essays on the Relationship of Intellect and Religion) 1391 Sh (n. d.). 

Qābil, Aḥmad, Naqd-i farhang-i khushūnat (the Critique of Violent Culture) 1381 Sh (n. d.).

Qābil, Aḥmad, Islam wa taʾmīn ijtimāʿī (Islam and Social Security) 1383 Sh, (n. d.).

Qulīpūr, Bihnām, Kudām marājiʿ taqlīd Shīʿa hijab ijbārī rā qabūl nadārand? (Which Source of Emulation Does Not Accept the Compulsory Hijab?), < https://iranwire.com/fa/features/112834-%DA%A9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B4%DB%8C%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF/?fbclid=IwY2xjawGXFQ1leHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHfHh1p-khsCE5hLeQaCXLk5npu3rv_JyT_H3Ah7-dxhh9hwOToEzEtEDgg_aem_hth9qrAXUU0Um4EK-H1Viw >, 2023, last accessed 05/08/2025.

Sanasarian, Eliz, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini, 1982 (Praeger Publishers Inc).

Ṣāniʿī, Yūsuf, Ijtihad pūyā az manẓar-i faqīh-i ahl-i bayt-i ʿiṣmat wa ṭahārat, ḥaḍrat Ayatollah al-ʿuẓmā Ṣāniʿī (Dynamic Ijtihad in the Thoughts of the Jurist of the Household of the Prophet, Ayatollah Ṣāniʿī), 1^st edition, 1390 Sh (Qom: Fiqh ul-thaqalayn publication). 

Ṣāniʿī, Yūsuf, Aḥkām-i bānuwān muṭābiq bā fatāwāya marjaʿi ʿālīqadr Ḥaḍrat Ayatollah al-ʿUẓmā Ḥājj Shaykh Yūsuf Ṣāniʿī (Women’s Rulings According to the fatāwā of Yūsuf Ṣāniʿī), 19^th edition, 1387 Sh (Qum: Maytham Tammār).

Takim, Liyakat, Shi’ism Revisited: Ijtihād and Reformation in Contemporary Times, 2022 (Oxford University Press).

Wasmaqī, Ṣiddīqah, Zan, Fiqh, Islam (Woman, Jurisprudence, Islam), 1387 Sh (Tehran: Ṣamadīyah).

Wasmaqī, Ṣiddīqah, Biḍāʿat-i fiqh wa gustaraya nufūdh-i fuqahā (the Capacity of Jurisprudence and the Scope of the Influence of the Jurists), 1388 Sh (n. d.).

Wasmaqī, Ṣiddīqah, Bāzkhwānīya sharīʿat (Rereading Sharīʿa), 1396 Sh (n. d.).

Websites

https://farsi.rouhollah.ir/ 

https://fa.shafaqna.com/ 

https://www.ibna.ir/  

https://www.isna.ir/ 

https://kadivar.com/ 

https://www.mehrnews.com/ 

https://www.almahdi.edu/ 

https://www.zeitoons.com/ 

https://www.asriran.com/ 

https://iranwire.com/fa/ 

[1] - < https://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh-imam-khomeini/vol/10/page/387 >, last accessed 10/19/2024.

[2] - The full account of the interview is here:

< https://fa.shafaqna.com/news/1226956/ >, last accessed 10/25/2024.

[3] - Shakhṣīyat wa ḥuqūq zan dar Islam (the Legal Status and the Rights of Women in Islam), 2^nd edition, 1386 Sh (Tehran: Shirkat-i Intishārāt-i ʿIlmī wa Farhangī).

[4] - Zan dar andīshaya islāmī (Woman in Islamic Thought), 1^st edition, 1381 Sh (Tehran: Sāzmān-i Chāp wa Intishārāt-i Wizārat-i Farhang Wa Irshād Islamī).

[5] - Zan wa Farhang-i Dīnī (Woman and Religious Culture), 1^st edition, 1382 Sh (Tehran: Nashr-i Hastīnamā).

[6] - The book is available here:

< https://kadivar.com/category/1-books/b-20/?fbclid=IwY2xjawGIiMxleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHeyiNFLfiDl8Bb269Y-ZuW1tPLi1atPmcoWatT4OhBZbJfB4hw_xYPs8zA_aem_hJqBqQzlfHduig3Ka5VHBw >, last accessed 10/25/2024.

[7] - I have discussed this new phase in jurisprudence here:

Human Rights and Muslims, The Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives, 2019 (edited by Ronald Lukens-Bull and Mark Woodward), Springer, pp. 701-718.

[8] - Including the trilogy of Zan, Fiqh, Islam (Woman, Jurisprudence, Islam), Biḍāʿat-i fiqh wa gustaraya nufūdh-i fuqahā (the Capacity of Jurisprudence and the Scope of the Influence of the Jurists) and Bāzkhwānīya sharīʿat (Rereading Sharīʿa).

[9] - Published as Sharīʿat-i ʿaqlānī (the Rational Sharīʿa) in 1391 Sh.

[10] - His thoughts on stoning was articulated in a series of writings, called Ḥukm-i rajm (the Stoning Ruling), which were publicized on Jaras Website in eight series, but their further publication was cancelled due to his imprisonment.

[11] - Published as Naqd-i farhang-i khushūnat (the Critique of Violent Culture) in 1381 Sh.

[12] - Published as Islam wa taʾmīn ijtimāʿī (Islam and Social Security) in 1383 Sh. 

[13] - Published as Aḥkām-i bānawān dar sharīʿat-i muḥammadī (Women Rulings in Muḥammedan sharīʿa) (1392 Sh).

[14] - The verse reads: “Men are the upholders and maintainers of women by virtue of that in which God has favored some of  them above others and by virtue of their spending from their wealth. Therefore, the righteous women are devoutly             obedient, guarding in [their husbands’] absence what   God has guarded. As for those from whom you fear

 discord and animosity, admonish them, then leave them in their beds, then strike them. Then if they obey you, seek not a way against             them. Truly God is Exalted, Great (Nasr, 2015, Op. cit., p. 381).

[15] - The whole lecture is available here:

< https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5623668/%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B2%D9%86-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C >, last accessed 10/28/2024.

[16] - The footage is available here: < https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/1009817/%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%B4%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF >, last accessed 11/1/2024.

[17] - The letter is accessible here: < https://www.zeitoons.com/105642 >, last accessed 11/1/2024.

[18] - According to qāʿadaya ʿumūmīya taʿzīrāt, people cannot be criminalized and punished on the basis of conjecture (ẓann) and without having certain proof and reasons.   

[19] - Eliz Sanasarian has discussed this in her book entitled The Women's Rights Movement in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini, 1982 (Praeger Publishers Inc).

[20] - On the 4^th and 5^th of March 2024, The Centre for Intra-Muslim Studies (CIMS) at al-Mahdi Institute in Birmingham, held its second academic workshop, looking at the theme of Muslims and their societal experiences with the themes of gender and sexuality. This ‘closed-door’ workshop sought to advance discussions into the academic arena, on issues that affect Muslims – across the denominational spectrum – and tackle the challenges in an impactful manner. However, bringing forth such topics to the attention of a private meeting, instead of denying them, is itself a step forward. For more information, please see < https://www.almahdi.edu/cims-workshop >, last accessed 10/29/2024.